p u b l i s h e d
On Groenendijk & Stokhof’s “Dynamic Predicate Logic”
In: A Readers’ Guide to Classic Papers in Formal Semantics
Volume 100 of SLAP, Springer
[draft]
A Problem about Preference
Philosophers’ Imprint 21(19): 1–33
[permalink]
Still Going Strong (with Kai von Fintel)
Natural Language Semantics 29: 91–113
doi.org/10.1007/s11050-020-09171-x
Updating Data Semantics
Mind 129(513): 1-41
doi:10.1093/mind/fzy008 [draft]
Plausible Deniability and Cooperation in Trust Games (with Mary Rigdon)
Review of Behavioral Economics 6(2): 95-118
doi:10.1561/105.00000103
Conditionals
In: Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Blackwell
Bob Hale, Alex Miller, and Crispin Wright, eds.
[draft]
Indicative Conditionals
In: Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, Routledge
Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara, eds.
[draft]
‘Might’ Made Right (with Kai von Fintel)
In: Epistemic Modality, Oxford University Press
Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, eds.
‘Must’ … Stay … Strong! (with Kai von Fintel)
Natural Language Semantics 18(4): 351-383
doi:10.1007/s11050-010-9058-2
Iffiness
Semantics & Pragmatics 3(4): 1–42
doi:10.3765/sp.3.4
On Truth Conditions for ‘If’ (But Not Quite Only ‘If’)
Philosophical Review 118(3):325–349
doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-002
CIA Leaks (with Kai von Fintel)
Philosophical Review} 117: 77–98
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-025
Counterfactual Scorekeeping
Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 329–360
doi:10.1007/s10988-007-9018-6
An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality (with Kai von Fintel)
Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2, Oxford University Press
Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, eds.
What Might Be the Case After a Change In View
Journal of Philosophical Logic 35(2): 117–145
doi:10.1007/s10992-005-9006-7
Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics
Noûs 38: 585–616
doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00485.x
New Foundations for Epistemic Change
Synthèse 138: 1–48
doi:10.1023/B:SYNT.0000012202.66263.b2
Common Ground, Corrections, and Coordination (with Nicholas Asher)
Argumentation 17: 481–512
doi:10.1023/A:1026346605477
A New Solution to Moore’s Paradox
Philosophical Studies 105: 237–250
doi:10.1023/A:1010361708803
Belief Revision and Epistemology (with John L. Pollock)
Synthèse 122: 69–92
doi:10.1023/A:1005220010407
d r a f t s & t h i n g s
Some iffy comments on Khoo 2022
Author Meets Critics Comments, Justin Khoo, The Meaning of ‘If’
[comments | handout]
Comments on: P. Hawke and S. Steinert-Threlkeld, “Assertability semantics” Pacific APA
[download]
Expressivism Updated?
Comments on: Malte Willer, “Advice for Noncogntivists” Central APA
[download]
Default Logic and ‘Hafta’
Author Meets Critics Comments, J. Horty, Reasons as Defaults
[download]
Formal Methods for Philosophical Analysis
(survey of logical/formal tools suitable for a grad course)
Hedging Your ‘If’s and Vice Versa (with Kai von Fintel)
[email for current draft]
> = \Box (+/- a Bit But Mostly +) (with Kai von Fintel)
[email for current draft] 